The later Rawls attempts to offer a non-comprehensive, but nonetheless moral justification in political philosophy. Many critics of political liberalism doubt that this is successful, but Rawlsians often complain that such criticisms rely on the unwarranted assumption that one cannot offer a moral justification other than by taking a philosophically comprehensive route. In this paper, I internally criticise the justification strategy employed by the later Rawls. I show that he cannot offer us good grounds for the rational hope that citizens will assign political values priority over non-political values in cases of conflict about political matters. I also suggest an alternative approach to justification in political philosophy -a weak realist, Williams-inspired account -that respects better the later Rawls' concern with non-comprehensiveness and pluralism than either his own view or more comprehensive approaches. Thus, if we take reasonable pluralism seriously, then we should adopt what Shklar aptly called ‗liberalism of fear'.
4 agreement is only superficial. As long as there is sufficient common ground to build a conception of justice which is non-comprehensive in the double sense specified above, then citizens might come to accept that conception, despite the disagreements about its deeper foundations. In this way, it might be possible to achieve agreement with philosophical foundations, but without this having to involve agreement on what these foundations are.
Many critics of the later Rawls doubt that this way of redirecting the search for a conception of justice is successful or attractive. In particular, they question that political liberalism is suitable to furnish what Rawls still takes to be the only adequate form of justification in political philosophy: a fully moral justification (as specified above). 4 However, Rawlsians often complain that these critics merely assume what is at issue -namely, that the only way one can build a fully moral justification in political philosophy is by way of a philosophically comprehensive route. 5 Why assume that when reasonable people agree that something is rationally acceptable, these people also need to agree about what makes it rationally acceptable? And why think that epistemic abstinence is a problem, when stronger claims are either unnecessary (because there already is a consensus) or unhelpful (when deep disagreements about the philosophical issues prevails)? To insist on the truth of one's conception of justice is merely to emphatically stamp one's foot. In sum, those defending the theory of the later Rawls argue that the critics do not sufficiently examine this theory on its own merits.
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In this paper, I will take up this challenge and argue by way of internal critique against the justification strategy offered by the later Rawls, showing it to fail on its own terms and without presupposing that philosophical comprehensiveness is necessary. I begin by laying out Rawls' strategy (section I). Then, I submit it to critical scrutiny (section II). Finally, I suggest an alternative way to think about justification in political philosophy -a way that better respects the later Rawls' concern with noncomprehensiveness and pluralism by giving up on the ideal of a fully moral justification (section III). Thus, if we follow the later Rawls in taking reasonable pluralism seriously, then we should adopt ‗liberalism of fear' instead of his political liberalism.
I. Rawls on justification in political philosophy
The later Rawls is most explicit about his conception of justification in ‗Reply to Habermas'. 6 He distinguishes between three levels of justification, in which citizens of democratic societies engage.
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The first level of justification concerns the coherence and completeness of political values in dealing with all questions which arise in respect to the political sphere. 8 It is here that the original position and the idea of a reflective equilibrium find their home in the theory of the later Rawls. Citizens start from their shared intuitions, our considered judgements, about the political; organise these intuitions and political values by constructing an heuristic device (the original position) which generates 6 principles of justice; they then check these principles against their initial intuitions and values; and then repeat this process until reaching a stable equilibrium, by either qualifying and dropping intuitions, or modifying the construction of the original position (so that it yields different principles), or both. 9 This first level of justification constitutes merely a pro tanto justification, since citizens have checked only for coherence and completeness of the shared political values and intuitions, not for whether the result is acceptable to each of them individually, as liberal legitimacy demands. 10 Rawls divides this latter step into two levels. At the second level of justification (‗full justification') each citizen checks individually whether or not her reasonable doctrine allows her to support the political conception of justice constructed at the first level of justification and thereby to accept the priority of political over non-political values. 11 Finally, citizens need to find assurance not only that they themselves individually, but also that all other citizens (or, at least, a sufficiently large majority of them) affirm the political conception from within their respective (reasonable)
worldviews.
This third level of justification is called ‗public justification' by Rawls. This label is somewhat misleading since he does not think that citizens jointly reconstruct a normative basis for their political conception (as Habermas argues should be the case).
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Rather, the third level of justification consists in finding out whether or not an 7 overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines exists. 13 Such a consensus is different from a mere compromise. Its object -the political conception of justice -has a pro tanto justification in moral terms and it is also supported for moral reasons from within the respective reasonable comprehensive doctrines of citizens, that is, for moral reasons external to the political conception which will differ from one citizen to another. In this way, an overlapping consensus makes ‗stability for the right reasons' possible. 14 Such stability is special insofar as the political-social institutions are supported by moral reasons (and at two levels: the level of pro tanto justification and from within comprehensive doctrines). 15 It is also special in a further sense: according to Rawls, a morally endorsed stability is more long-lasting than a prudential compromise (a ‗mere modus vivendi' in his terms), since it is not hostage to the fortune of shifting power alliances. 16 Furthermore, in aiming for a morally endorsed stability, Rawls is aiming for what I call a fully moral justification in political philosophy: both the object of his theory (a conception of justice detailing a well-ordered society which is stable for the right reasons) and the reasons supporting it are moral in nature (both political-moral and comprehensive-moral).
In sum, at the third level of justification, citizens assign normative weight to the existence of an overlapping consensus, since its emergence confirms that it is possible to arrive at principles for fair cooperation over time, while also respecting their different comes to questions concerning the basic structure of society). Fourthly, citizens do not just value outcomes, but also the legitimacy of democratic decision-making procedures, and this might give them a sufficient reason to continue to endorse political liberalism, even if they disagree with the decisions taken by the majority on particular policy matters, such as going to war or making abortion legal. 37 Finally, and most importantly, Rawls argues that most citizens have merely incomplete (‗partial') and loose conceptions of the good, and this will make it easier for political values to be integrated within these doctrines in such a way that they are assigned priority over other values on questions of basic justice.
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None of these reasons are convincing. As has been widely pointed out, the first one just asserts what is at issue, namely, whether or not political values have sufficient normative force to trump non-political ones in cases of conflict. 39 To some extent, Rawls is here guilty of the same problematic move which he and his defenders criticise in those who belong to the truth camp: to say that political values are great values is to emphatically stamp one's foot, not to give an argument. 40 Perhaps, the point is that in giving non-political values priority over political ones, a citizen would be risking the social order of modern democracies and the goods it brings. However, it is unclear what else this is other than an appeal to prudential considerations (which are not relevant for a fully moral justification but more apt to support a modus vivendi). Also, one need not One might reply here that this criticism overlooks that the political conception has moral value in respecting the fact of oppression (that is, the fact that a comprehensive doctrine could not be justified to citizens divided by reasonable pluralism, but only coercively imposed on them). 42 Thus, those who deny the priority of the political over the non-political values in the political domain are unreasonable, since they are prepared to give up on the idea of justification acceptable to each citizen in their court of reason and impose their view on them, even at the expense of the evil of oppression.
However, this reply misses the mark. Firstly, it is not true that only a fully moral justification would respect the fact of oppression -a more minimal justification could do so too (such as liberalism of fear, to which I return below Taking all of these considerations together, Rawls is either wrong in thinking that political liberalism is compatible with the familiar and traditional doctrines, or he cannot provide a fully moral justification. Either way, we still have not been given good grounds for the rational hope that stability for the right reasons and an overlapping consensus (as different from a modus vivendi) are attainable.
The third reason Rawls offers to explain why citizens would assign priority to political values is also unconvincing. The fact that political values are not presented as, all things considered, the most important values is little comfort to those who are hesitant about giving them priority in political matters. This is especially so as the 20 extent of the political in Rawls' conception is, arguably, very far-reaching. 51 We are, after all, talking of all the questions which affect the political, economic and major social institutions, either directly or indirectly. 52 Thus, many central issues in our lives will be political and, hence, be affected by the priority of political over non-political values. This means that conceding that non-political values have possibly greater importance than political ones outside of the political sphere will make little practical difference, and it is unlikely that those who reject the priority of political values within the political sphere will be satisfied by this concession. Consequently, the priority of political values could stay controversial and give rise to conflicts, even if this priority is limited in scope to the political sphere.
The fourth consideration, that is, having recourse to the value of the procedural legitimacy of democratic decision-making, is also insufficient to account for the priority of political values. Furthermore, this is the case on Rawls' own conception of procedural legitimacy. Rawls distinguishes legitimacy from justice, though he also claims that legitimacy cannot deviate too far from justice without becoming ‗corrupted'. 53 Thus, while the two notions do not coincide, legitimacy is still constrained by justice: it is a ‗purely procedural' ideal, but only within a certain range of not too unjust outcomes. 54 In effect, the constitutional essentials fix the range of reasonably just outcomes, within which we can use legitimate procedures to choose specific policies. The constitutional essentials themselves, on the other hand, are not 21 legitimated with the help of democratic procedures. They need to be justified by ‗addressing each citizen's reason'. 55 This means that the value which citizens might attach to democratic procedures is, on Rawls' own account of it, only relevant when it comes to accepting an unwelcome policy, not when it comes to the constitutional essentials -in the latter case, the value of democratic procedures is not of the right kind to outweigh concerns one might have about substantive issues. 56 Yet, the question of the priority of political over non-political values does not just come in at the level of policy issues, but also at the level of constitutional essentials. Admittedly, Rawls might claim that, for example, the debate about the permissibility of abortion is merely a debate about policy issues. However, at least the pro-life side of the debate would beg to differ: they would argue that the inviolability of human life is at stake in the debate and that this is clearly a constitutional essential.
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The final reason Rawls offers to explain how citizens would give political values priority is also problematic. The obstacle to this priority is less that citizens's comprehensive conceptions of the good are complete or tightly systematised -Rawls might be right that most citizens's doctrines are neither. Rather, the real obstacle is how strongly citizens are attached to individual elements in their doctrines. 58 Thus, someone might subscribe to a not fully worked out worldview, but still think that there are certain fixed points, such as the claims (a) that slavery is wrong (something which Rawls agrees is a fixed point in the modern world), 59 or (b) the claim that abortion should be 22 outlawed (something Rawls does not endorse). 60 No matter what views citizens with incomplete and loose doctrines will adopt about truth or metaphysics, it is not unlikely that they would want to hold on to their fixed points -they constitute bright white lines which citizens would not be prepared to cross. 61 This shows that the problem with the theory of the later Rawls is not just that an overlapping consensus is impossible or unlikely, but deeper. The problem is that he claims that he can still deliver a fully moral justification of the conception of justice. He does not realise that it is insufficient for such a justification to have stability for the right reasons as an aim, but not to have an account of how such stability could arise for the right reasons, that is, moral reasons which could justify why moving to an overlapping consensus and giving political values priority over non-political ones is the right thing to do. In order to achieve what Rawls sets out to achieve, he would have to appeal to the kind of Kantian arguments about moral rightness and truth which he wants to avoid -to arguments which would show that, whatever particular worldview one subscribes to, our autonomous will guided by practical reason requires us to give justice priority. 
III. The moral of the story: comprehensive justice or non-Rawlsian legitimacy
Where does this leave the question of justification in political philosophy? Habermas has a clear answer: he thinks that a procedural, but philosophically comprehensive account is both unavoidable and possible. 69 Dworkin and Raz would agree with the need for philosophical comprehensiveness, but take a more substantive route instead (such as, in Dworkin's case, relying on the challenge model of the good life). 70 Similarly, others also argue that a defence of liberal political philosophy cannot be philosophically neutral in the way the later Rawls claims, and they suggest going back to something like the picture presented by the early Rawls.
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However, one could also give up on the idea of fully moral justifications and move to a realist picture. Realism in political philosophy can take two different forms.
According to its strong variant, politics is just a game of power and self-interest, and 26 political philosophy ignores this at its peril. 72 On this picture, justifications play no or at most an epiphenomenal role. Weak realists, on the other hand, can admit that the influence of moral reasons and ideals on politics is not always futile or illegitimate (and that political philosophy should make use of them). Still, for them politics is not merely an exercise in applied ethics, that is, politics is not the implementation of a moral conception which is conceived or constructed independently of what are, according to weak realism, the distinctive features of the political realm (such as the importance and difficulty of maintaining civil order; the limitations of political agents; and entrenched value pluralism).
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In fact, adopting a realist outlook would respect the key motivation behind Rawls' move to political liberalism better than holding on to the idea of fully moral justifications at the expense of philosophical neutrality. It was the recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism which made Rawls give up on the philosophical status of these views. 74 Moreover, because of this fact, there may be something to the idea that justification in political philosophy needs to be non-comprehensive. To recall, the main idea of reasonable pluralism is that there is so much leeway involved in the judgements which make up our worldviews that even reasonable citizens can disagree about which worldview is the right one. 75 This is to say that even citizens who are genuinely willing to be convinced by reasons need not necessarily agree on this matter, even if the discussion has been free and the conditions ideal for the exchange of reasons. Perhaps, the best way to achieve this is to adopt a weak realist perspective, such as one influenced by the work of Williams. He does not think that politics -even at its best -is or should be merely the application of moral ideals and reasons. This makes him a realist, albeit of the weak kind, since he is not against the idea of justification or the role of moral ideals and reasons in politics per se. In fact, according to Williams, a claim to legitimacy (though perhaps not to justice) is constitutive of politics, not an external and independent moral standard brought to it. 77 In contrast to naked conflict or warfare, politics is about rulers claiming that they wield coercive power with legitimate authority and that citizens would be wrong to fight back. Now, often this claim might be false, but at least it suggests that the question of legitimacy cannot be neatly separated from politics, and with that question, the further question of justification is on the How would a liberalism of fear handle the difficult cases considered earlier, such as the (im)permissibility of abortion, or objections to the public education of children?
Much of the debate would presumably be conducted in terms of the universally accepted evils mentioned above. Admittedly, for many morally and doctrinally contentious issues, such as abortion, this is unlikely to suffice for a consensus -the evil of premature death is one of the factors the pro-life side would emphasise, while the pro-choice side would view legal restrictions as oppressive use of state power. If taking a legal stance is unavoidable (as with abortion), then whatever legal regime is put in place will depend -as always in democratic politics -on a mixture of interests, pressure, the imagination and resourcefulness of the different actors involved, and other factors impacting on the institutional mechanisms that pass and regulate such a regime.
As a limiting case, liberalism of fear would provide dissenters to an existing legal regime only with prudential reasons against taking violent means to oppose this regime.
It would also provide such reasons in defence of legally constituted and consistently administered use of state power to maintain civil order against violent dissenters. Those who think that more is required would have to turn to philosophically comprehensive accounts (be it of a procedural or substantive kind). Nothing I argued here bars them from doing so, though they face the challenge of having to address Habermas, 1995 Raz, 1990; and Barry, 1995. 5 See, for example, Dreben, 2003; and Larmore, 1990 ; see also and Peritz. A related strategy is to attempt to make truth safe for political liberalism, either by operating with truth in a minimal sense or by offering a political conception of it (see Estlund, 1998; Cohen, 2009 Geuss, 2008, 80-94, especially 85-6, 92; McCarthy, 1994: 61-2; and Wolf, 1997: 61-2 ; see also PL, 9.
23 PL, 101, 172; see also Cohen, 1994 Cohen, : 1509 and Laden, 2003: 386 . can itself reconcile us to the social world. (...) For as long as we believe for good reasons that a selfsustaining and reasonably just political and social order both at home and abroad is possible, we can reasonably hope that we and others will someday, somewhere, achieve it; and we can then do something towards this achievement' (LP, 128). See also Hill, 2000: 242, 252, 254n31. 27 Rawls is explicit that he aims at hope, but cannot provide a guarantee (PL, 65; see also xlvii-viii; JF, 37). His concern with rational hope is also different from making predictions, and this might explain why he does not engage in certain empirical enquires which his explanatory quest might suggest that he should engage in -such as detailed political sociology or historical analysis. See also Hill, 2000: 248-9; and Baier, 1989: 783. 28 PL, 159; JF, 192. 29 See, for example, Williams, 2005: 2n2. 30 According to Rawls, the move beyond a mere modus vivendi will be helped by the following advantages of liberal principles of justice: (1) ‗(...) they fix, once and for, all the content of certain political basic rights and liberties, and to assign them special priority' (PL, 161; JF, 194) , which is important given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the possible conflicts this could give rise to; (2) their application has a certain simplicity which makes it easier for people to check that justice has been done (PL, 162; JF, 194) ; and (3) once institutionalised, the liberal principles encourage the political virtues (PL, 163; JF, 194) , such as fairmindedness, thereby helping to sustain stability for the right reasons. For a critique of (1), see Macebo, 1990: 287-8. 31 PL, 158-168. 32 PL, 139; see also 155, 393; JF, 183, 189. 
